Principle of justice and equity is a term, although it is seen in recent jurisprudents'' writings, which have not been explained clearly at all. Therefore, some of the jurisprudents do not accept this term as a principle; some others accept it as a principle and consider its implementation in case of being a special reason; and other group of jurisprudents accept it as a principle but limited to a specific subject. In this paper, it is tried to search in legal and jurisprudential sources collect valid documents to prove this principle, and then to specify framework and scope of its implication to reach an effective rule in the process of inference obviously.

A double ambiguity has been charged against Rawls’s difference principle (DP). Is it Maximin, Leximin, or something else? Usually, following A. Sen, scholars identify DP with the so-called Leximin. One argues here that one has to distinguish 1° the Leximin, 2° the Maximin (as rule of justice formally analogous to the maximin rule of decision), represented by the figure in L of the perfectly substitutable goods, and 3° the genuine DP. When the augmentation of inequality benefits the worse off, only Pareto-strong improvements are permitted. Leximin would also permit Pareto-weak improvements too (after the first maximum D), where only the richest improves: from (2, 3) to (2, 5), say. This is forbidden by DP. With two classes, unlike Maximin, DP has no curve of indifference and is always decisive, as Leximin is. For undecisive Rules of Justice, which admit indifferent curves, I propose to add a lexically secondary rule, to break ties. That move is able to clarify the links and the differences between on the one hand Maximin alone, with its typical indifference curves in L, and on the other hand, the DP properly understood and the Leximin, which both have no indifferent curves. With two classes of persons (best off/worse off), DP appears more egalitarian than Leximin, because it's secondary rule is MinIn (Minimization of Inequality). But the intuition behind the distinction is that it cannot possible “fair” that only the best off improves in a productive social cooperation.

Universal health coverage (UHC) is defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) as when ‘, all individuals and communities receive the health services they need without suffering financial hardship including ‘, health promotion …,prevention, treatment, rehabilitation, and palliative care. ’, 1 Achieving UHC globally is part of the United Nations’,Sustainable Development Goals and central to the 2018 WHO Global Conference on Primary Health Care Astana Declaration. 2 Universal systems of primary healthcare (PHC) within countries are widely recognised as central to the task of achieving UHC. 2 Such systems are crucial to reduce the adverse impacts of both communicable and non-communicable diseases (NCDs) and reduce health inequities within and between countries. However, while the WHO’, s and the United Nations’,objectives for UHC seem clear, putting those objectives into practice, with PHC systems capable –,over time –,of delivering the desired health outcomes, is quite another matter. In 2020 we published an article in this journal3 examining lessons from the relatively mature Australian system of UHC on how to structure and deliver a system of universal PHC to address NCDs, deliver equity of access to services and, ultimately, promote health equity. (Hereafter we will use ‘, equity’,as shorthand for the two latter goals). We identified both strengths and weaknesses of the Australian system in this regard. The journal then sought and published eight commentaries on our article from experts in UHC and PHC from around the globe. 4-11 Together with our original article, these thoughtful commentaries reinforce our contention that, while commitment to a principle of UHC is welcome, and implies concerns for equity, actual benefits for equity will depend on how UHC is defined and implemented in practice. 6 In this reply, we describe common themes arising from the commentaries, which highlight key issues for policy makers implementing UHC, and respond to points raised about limitations of our research. Although our research focus (conceived in 2015) was on system responses to NCDs, several commentators noted relevance of the issues raised for the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. . .

The principle of equity in international law is of multi-dimensional and complex nature always being debated in the international legal doctrine.However, the International Court of Justice has played a significant role in the determination of the examples of this principle. While interpreting the relevant rules, the court has sometimes made effective inferences which are very helpful to understand the content of the principle of equity and its legal standards. The principle of equity has been reflected in the jurisprudence of ICJand the opinion of Judges in various forms. The purpose of this article is to elaborate this variety by analyzing the decisions of ICJ containing arguments on equity. The main question is to determine the capabilities of the principle of equity in developing international law and maintaining its dynamic nature particularly its law making capacity in order to develop international law.

One of the most alive and, to be sure, complicated political and legal events in the Caspian Sea region is the unresolved issue of its legal regime. The Caspian Sea, as a closed sea, has had a volatile history in terms of its legal regime and for the time being one cannot see a clear vision for solving its legal regime problem. The Caspian states have reached a consensus on the issues of environment and territorial as well as the special fishing zone, but the complex Caspian marathon in the exclusive economic zone and also continental shelf of the sea, remains unsolved. In this regard, if we look at the Islamic Republic of Iran’ s position on the legal status of the Caspian Sea, we will see that Iran refers to the "principle of equity" as a basis for the division or delimitation of the Caspian Sea in order to restore its lost rights. This article tries to examine the meaning of the principle of equity as an element of natural justice and to elaborate the practice of the International Court of Justice regarding the delimitation of the continental shelf. We try to reach an accurate understanding of this term and its scope so as to reach a definite idea on the delimitation of the seabed and subsoil of the Caspian Sea.

The indefinite nature of test fairness and different interpretations and definitions of the concept have stirred a lot of controversy over the years, necessitating the reconceptualization of the concept. On this basis, this study aimed to explore the empirical validity of Kunnan’s (2008) Test Fairness Framework (TFF) and revisit the established test fairness conceptualization following the principles of grounded theory. To this end, 10 university lecturers of TEFL, 20 high school English language teachers, 15 PhD students in TEFL, and 15 MA students in TEFL participated in open-ended and semi- structured interviews. Following grounded theory rubrics, the researchers read, codified, and analyzed the obtained interview data. Simultaneously, memos were written, comparisons were drawn, possibilities were seen, and robust categories were developed through theoretical sampling. This process continued iteratively until the categories saturated. Next, the categories were juxtaposed and compared to see how they fit together and finally several major categories emerged accordingly. The opinions were diagrammed and a visual image of the categories and their relevant scope, power, and associations were represented to construct a theoretical logic. The new hierarchy of test fairness categories became discernible as the interviewees named distinct characteristics for a fair test. The identified levels of the new conceptualization of test fairness were entitled validity, construction and structure, administration, scoring, reporting, decision-making, consequences, security, explicitness, accountability, equality, and rights. The need for advancing context-specific and locally agreed-upon equity principles as driven by the impossibility of the fulfillment of the equality principle in the real world conditions is an important finding of this study with concrete implications for both theory and practice in the field.

The precautionary principle has been widely discussed in academic, legal and political areas. Debates stem due to various definitions and wordings of the principle and the fact that it has been reflected in both binding and nonbinding international instruments in various fields. The role of the European Union and its members is undisputed in the evolution of the principle. It can be found in different contexts; from its statements in international disputes to Jurisprudence of its judicial organs. This paper, with an analytical-descriptive approach, examines the situation of the precautionary principle in Domestic legal systems of European countries, primary and secondary rules of the EU and the jurisprudence of general courts, ECJ and ECHR to prove or deny the customary nature of the principle in this region.